Akin's comments about "legitimate rape" went against science and reality, but that's par for the course when it comes to an anti-choice movement that ignores the lives and feelings of women in order to paint them as reproductive objects who deserve no say in how they're used.
The good news about the Rep. Todd Akin situation is that it genuinely seems to have raised the public’s awareness of how much the anti-choice movement is rooted not in some love of fetal life, but in a profound misogyny that focuses heavily on fear of female sexuality. Akin’s ready assumption that women frequently lie about rape to cover up their sexual adventures was a perfect example of the demonized view of female sexual liberty driving the anti-choice movement, one that has very little relation to how women actually act in the world. But the exposure of the ugly, misogynist heart of the anti-choice movement might come at a price: Other dehumanizing, ugly attitudes towards women expressed by anti-choicers might seem more moderate by comparison.
For instance, Rep. Paul Ryan, now a nominee for Vice President, has a long history of using incredibly dehumanizing language towards women and speaking of women as if they non-sentient beings, while seemingly imbuing even fertilized eggs with the sentience he won’t grant women. Even though he’s no doubt been strongly coached to try to at least mimic compassion for women, the notion that women have internal lives and experiences that matter just doesn’t seem to factor into his discussion of reproductive rights. Instead, he just falls back on talking about women as if they’re nothing but flesh-bound ovens to cook male heirs. Which, naturally, led to the same kind of minimization of rape that Akin is accused of engaging in.
During an interview with WJHL this week, Ryan was asked his view about Rep. Todd Akin, who recently asserted that women could not get pregnant from “legitimate rape.”
“Specifically where you stand when it comes to rape, and when it comes to the issue of should it be legal for a woman to be able to get an abortion if she’s raped?” WJHL reporter Josh Smith wondered.
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“I’m very proud of my pro-life record, and I’ve always adopted the idea that, the position that the method of conception doesn’t change the definition of life,” Ryan explained. “But let’s remember, I’m joining the Romney-Ryan ticket. And the president makes policy.”
As usual, he struggles to even acknowledge women. Rape is just a “method of conception,” relegating women to the means of conception, instead of, you know, people whose experiences, hopes, and fears actually matter. He might as well be talking about cooking eggs. Some people scramble eggs and some people make omelets, but no matter the method of cooking, it’s still eggs! Ryan may accept that perhaps raping isn’t the preferred method of sperm delivery to the vessel, but at the end of the day, the only thing that really matters is that the sperm got delivered and that the vessel not be allowed a say in the matter.
At least Todd Akin granted women enough agency to be considered liars. Ryan doesn’t seem to have even given that much thought to the proposition that women have minds working behind their eyeballs.
When talking about rape, the ugliness and dehumanization of women is much more obvious to the public, but it’s important to understand that this utter unwillingness to see women as people—instead of just Easy Bake ovens that make people–is shot throughout anti-choice sentiment.
Fundamentally, the debate over abortion is a debate over what we make of the fact that some of us in this world can have babies. For pro-choicers, “being able to make babies” is a nifty thing to be able to do, like being able to play the piano or being able to bake pies. It’s your skill, your ability. You should use it how you like. We would no more force a woman to make a baby because she can than insist that someone who can play the piano drop everything they’re doing at a moment’s notice to play because we want them to.
For anti-choicers, the fact that someone can make a baby means that making babies is what she is for. People mistake the term “objectification” to mean “looking at with lust,” but what it actually means is “reducing someone to an object to be used.” Sexual objectification is assuming that because women turn you on, they are for sex, instead of a person whose sexuality should be an expression of their agency. What anti-choicers engage in is reproductive objectification. Women are among an array of objects to be used. The refrigerator is for storing food. The bookshelf is for holding books. The woman is for making babies. You no more give her a choice in the matter than you would give your refrigerator veto power over what food it hold because it didn’t like your method of shopping.
What we need is for people to sit up and really listen to language like “method of conception,” and not just because it minimizes rape, but because it’s part of a larger way of perceiving women as nothing but vessels. We denounce the pseudo-science and magical thinking that led Akin to claim that rape can’t cause pregnancy, but this entire perception of women is also based in magical thinking. The unwillingness to see that women are fully present human beings, instead of baby factories that were unwittingly given the right to vote, also defies basic scientific understanding.
It’s not like the evidence is inconclusive to draw the conclusion that women are people with subjective experiences, just like men. Women have basically been telling the world this since the beginning of time, no matter how much pressure is put on them by patriarchy to instead act like compliant robots that shoot out heirs. Women have always expressed feelings, created art, and had dreams. Women communicate their personhood all the damn time. Anti-choicers just simply refuse to see the evidence in front of them, instead projecting all this sentience onto embryos that don’t actually have any feelings or thoughts. The inability of the anti-choice movement to see reality is about a lot more than their misunderstanding of how human reproduction works; it’s the very foundation of their entire worldview that relegates thinking, feeling, communicating women to the status of inanimate objects.
Because of Sex: One Law, Ten Cases, and Fifty Years That Changed American Women’s Lives at Work, written by Gillian Thomas, senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project, goes beyond cases that helped shape workplace anti-discrimination policies. Rather, it focuses on ten key women whose own lives changed the law.
In 1966, Ida Phillips, a single mother working as a waitress, sat down at her kitchen table and wrote a letter to then-President Lyndon B. Johnson. She told him her story: Despite her qualifications, Phillips had been told by a Martin Marietta employee not to apply for an assembly-line position at one of the construction-material company’smanufacturing plant. The job would have paid more than double what she was making as a waitress. It included a pension plan and insurance, benefits unavailable in most female-dominated industries at the time (and which since have only marginally improved.) The reason Phillips was turned away? She was a woman with a preschool child.
That letter, Phillips’ subsequent lawsuit, and her Supreme Court win would help spark a civil rights revolution in the workplace—one with consequences that reverberate today.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. And it was Phillips’ case, and the nine others profiled in the book, that would ultimately shape that law into one that, decades later, is an important tool in advancing gender and sex equality. As Thomas explained to Rewire in an interview, Title VII it is not just a foundational piece of civil rights legislation important for its historical effect on workplace equality. In the face of anti-transgender bathroom bills and statewide “religious liberties” legislation sweeping the country, it is a crucial tool for pushing equality forward.
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Thomas’ book is organized along three key themes in employment discrimination law: pregnancy-related workplace policies, gender stereotypes in the workplace, and sexual harassment. Those themes act as an inroad toward thinking more broadly about how, in Thomas’ words, we achieve “substantive equality” in the workplace. They illustrate how early fights over promotions and workplace policies that kept women out of certain jobs due to concerns of harming their potential fertility foreshadowed the legal showdowns over contraception coverage in employee health-care plans in cases like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby andZubik v. Burwell.
“The subject matter areas that I saw [as a researcher and employment discrimination litigator] were, number one, women’s capacity for pregnancy, and then their subsequent roles as mothers, which, historically, has played a huge role in their second-class status legally,” Thomas told Rewire. “Women of color have always been seen as workers, irrespective of whether they had children, so that’s not an entirely universal stereotype. But I think it’s pretty safe to say that generally pregnancy and motherhood have proven to be enormous conflicts in terms of what equality looks like when you have these distinct differences” in how race and gender are perceived.
Take, for instance, the case of Peggy Young and the question whether an employer can refuse to make on-the-job accommodations for pregnant employees when it does so for nonpregnant employees. Young, another one of the women featured in Thomas’ book, was a United Parcel Service (UPS) “air driver” who became pregnant. When Young told her employer she was pregnant, UPS told her they couldn’t accommodate the light-lifting recommendation made by Young’s medical providers. Instead, UPS told Young, she would have to take unpaid medical leave for the remainder of her pregnancy.
In March 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against UPS, vacating the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that had supported UPS’ policy. The decision produced a new test for assessing pregnancy discrimination claims and sent Young’s case back to the lower courts for another look. Not long after the Roberts Court’s decision, UPS and Young settled the lawsuit, bringing an end to Young’s case.
The decision was a qualified win for advocates. The Roberts Court had accepted Young’s argument that UPS had no legitimate business reason for failing to accommodate her particular request, but the decision went short of ruling businesses must accommodate any pregnancy request.
But Because of Sex doesn’t stop at unpacking overt discrimination like the kind detailed in Young’s 2015 case or Phillips’ one in 1966. The book also takes a look at what the law has described as more “benevolent” kinds of discrimination. These include employment policies designed to “protect” women from endangering possible future pregnancies, such as prohibiting women employees from working jobs where they may be exposed to hazardous chemicals.
“It really all boils down to two issues that we are talking about in all these things,” Thomas explained, when discussing workplace policies that, employers have argued, were put in place to protect their female employees from potentially endangering a pregnancy. “One is [employers] ignoring hazards that apply to men and making women into baby-making machines. And number two is [employers] treating health effects or health hazards on the job as reasons for diminishing women’s opportunities, instead of arming women with information and assuming that they will make the right choice for themselves.”
This disconnect is most apparent in the case of United Automobile Workersv. Johnson Controls, Inc., another case Thomas highlights in her book. In 1982, the car battery manufacturer Johnson Controls sent a memorandum to all its employees that said “[w]omen who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs involving lead exposure or which would expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights.”
The policy amounted to a demotion for many female employees and a closed door for others.
Title VII actually permits employers, in a limited context, to have employment policies that discriminate on their face, such as policies that permit churches to only hire members of the same faith. Johnson Controls argued its policy of keeping women out of certain positions due to employer concerns of health risks to future pregnancies fit within Title VII’s narrow window for permitting explicit discrimination.
The Supreme Court would eventually rule in 1991 that Johnson Controls’ policy violated Title VII because it forced female employees to have to choose “between having a child and having a job,” thereby rejecting the argument made by Johnson Control’s that a woman’s fertility—or infertility—can in most situations be considered a bona fide occupational qualification.
As Thomas noted in her book, “It was no coincidence that fetal protection politics were most prevalent in well-paid, unionized industries from which women historically had been excluded. Indeed they had been excluded precisely because they had been deemed physically unsuited for the dirty, sometimes strenuous work.”
But “in female-dominated fields, though, fetal protection policies made no business sense; they effectively would gut the workforce. That reality apparently trumped any hypothetical harm to employees’ future pregnancies,” Thomas wrote.
In other words, these policies didn’t exist in female-dominated fields.
Johnson Controls may have helped grant women the agency to determine how and when they earned a paycheck with regard to policies targeting their potential fertility, but it hardly ended the debate around when and how employers attempt to diminish women’s opportunities related to their roles as potential mothers. This has played out in the hundreds of lawsuits over the contraception benefit, for example.
In other words, if Johnson Controls had settled the question of whether a woman’s fertility was an appropriate grounds for discrimination, we would not have Hobby Lobby.
Because of Sex draws another connection between the historical fight over Title VII and the contemporary one: How do employers adjust workplace policies around shifting gender norms, and when is it discriminatory if they don’t? The law asks, “What are women supposed to want to do?” said Thomas in her interview with Rewire. “What work are they able to do? What work do they want to do? [Given] assumptions and stereotypes that are about their abilities, their preferences, their interests and how [they are] conforming to [those] in terms of stereotypes about what femininity is—what [are] women … supposed to look and act like?”
Gender nonconforming behavior, and the manner in which employees experience discrimination as a result of that behavior, is a key component over the debate around transgender rights. But it would take a “shrill” woman and the birth of the notion of “workplace harassment” to get us and the law there first.
By every measure, Ann Hopkins should have been made a partner in the global accounting firm Price Waterhouse. She was smart. Ambitious. Worked hard and constantly outperformed her peers. But it was those very attributes that her male partners deemed “too aggressive” or as evidence that she needed “charm school,” and ultimately used to deny her a partnership that by every objective measure she had earned.
The Supreme Court would ultimately disagree. In 1989, it ruled Hopkins should have been made a partner and that the comments relating to her demeanor amounted to improper gender stereotyping, a violation of Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions.
If Hopkins was initially shut out of workplace advancement due to her defiance of feminine stereotypes, so too are women subjected to on-the-job harassment, as Thomas draws out in Because of Sex. “Sexual harassment didn’t even have a name in 1974, but was such a prevalent force driving women out of the work force, driving them into different jobs [and] subjugating them just generally in terms of the identity as sexual objects on the job,” Thomas further explained in her interview.
1974 was the year Mechelle Vinson first hired a lawyer to represent her in a case against her boss, who was chronically sexually abusing her on the job. But at the time, courts largely wrote off those kinds of complaints as a kind of chasing-around-the-office, and not sexual harassment, or in Vinson’s case, on-the-job rape. As described by Thomas in her book, “throughout the 1970s, many courts responded to complaints about abusive bosses with a collective shrug that conveyed, ‘You can’t blame a guy for trying.'”
“Sexual harassment was such a prevalent force driving women out of the workforce, driving them into different jobs, and subjugating them just generally in terms of the identity as sexual objects on the job,” Thomas told Rewire.
That “you can’t blame a guy for trying” attitude hasn’t completely gone away as far as the federal courts are concerned. After all, in 2013 the Roberts Court in Vance v. Ball Statemade it even harder for employees to bring workplace harassment suits, and employees still face losing jobs for “being too cute” or having their sexuality be a perceived threat to their employer’s ability to remain professional in the workplace.
Which is why, in the fight over transgender bathroom access in 2016, Title VII should be a powerful force in defeating these latest attempts to stymie social progress. The idea that “you can’t blame a guy for trying” has morphed into “how the hell can we police gender roles if we don’t know where you pee.” That’s thanks almost entirely to the manner in which the law has wrestled with gender stereotypes under Title VII, Thomas explained.
In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with enforcing workplace anti-discrimination laws, issued the landmark decision Macy v. Holder, which held that employment discrimination based on transgender status was a form of unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. Then in 2015, it issued a ruling stating that denying employees access to restrooms consistent with their gender identity is also a violation of Title VII. Meanwhile several federal courts of appeals have ruled that Title VII protects against gender identity discrimination.
But the Roberts Court has yet to weigh in.
“I think sexual orientation in a way is the sort of a final frontier” in Title VII litigation, said Thomas. “The court seems really fixated on this idea of analogizing very precisely from Hopkins. In other words, if you look or act in a way that doesn’t conform to gender stereotypes then, OK, [the courts] can understand that’s sex discrimination,” said Thomas. “But if your identity is not conforming to stereotypes in that you, you know, are romantically attracted to someone of your sex, that is harder for [the courts] to get, even though it’s obviously the most obvious manifestation of stereotype.”
This is, in many ways, a fight that started in the workplace—one that eventually got the backing of the Obama administration before becoming a flashpoint of conservative election-cycle politics. Thomas’ book doesn’t close on a prediction of what the next big Title VII fight will be per se, but it is impossible to finish it and not see the narrative threads of the historical fight for workplace equality woven throughout the the contemporary one. Sex. Gender. How the law understands and navigates the two. All this is what makes Thomas’ Because of Sex the closest thing to an assigned reading I can make.
Abortion opponents regularly talk as though no restriction is off the table when it comes to stripping away reproductive rights. And supporters of abortion rights don’t always set them straight. If we don’t know what our established rights are, we can’t defend them. Pro-choicers need to know why abortion is a constitutional right and what boundaries the U.S. Supreme Court has set out to protect it.
1. Abortion is protected by the rights to bodily integrity and to make decisions about family. The Court explained that decades ago.
The 14th Amendment prohibits states from depriving a person of liberty without due process of law. A person has the right to end a pregnancy without undue interference from the government because that right to liberty includes (1) the right to make decisions about family and (2) the right to bodily integrity.
However, in order to portray abortion rights as illegitimate, conservatives like to argue—inaccurately—thatthe Court legalized abortion in Roe v. Wade by inventing a right to privacy that is not grounded in the Constitution’s actual text.
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In the pre-Roe contraception case Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Court did hold that “penumbras, formed by emanations” or various interpretations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments protect a right to privacy. But in deciding Roe, the Warren court located the right to privacy in the 14th Amendment’s explicit protection of the right to liberty. Regardless, the Court’s understanding of the rights that protect reproductive freedom expanded beyond just privacy decades ago.
Privacy is barely mentioned in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which established the current law governing abortion rights more than 20 years ago. “The controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty,’” the decision explained. It was settled law prior to Roe that liberty includes “the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.”
Privacy is also a constitutional right, and it was indeed violated by the laws at issue in Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton. Those laws required a woman seeking an abortion to share her reasons for wanting the procedure with legal or medical authorities to have any hope of receiving legal abortion care. However, the law and discourse around privacy at the time of Roe implied a woman should be permitted to use contraception or end a pregnancy because the state should not interfere in decisions made in secret with the permission of her doctor, husband, father, pastor, or others. Casey instead properly recognized that the 14th Amendment protects a person’s right to control her body and destiny.
So why has the idea persistedthat all we’ve got is a privacy right made up out of thin air? A counterintuitive and less textually based right serves abortion opponents, but abortion rights advocates also have a history of telling us abortion restrictions are primarily a threat to privacy. As William Saletan documented in Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the War on Abortion, in the run-up to Casey, pro-choice leaders emphasized privacy on the advice of pollsters and political consultants to appeal to anti-government, anti-welfare, anti-tax, and anti-integration sentiments. While reproductive rights lawyers argued to the Supreme Court that the Constitution’s protection of autonomy, bodily integrity, and equality protected abortion access, outside of court pro-choice leaders told the public the right at stake was privacy. But, ultimately, the Casey decision provided a much fuller discussion of why abortion is constitutionally protected by rights beyond privacy.
Abortion is protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment (which restricts the federal government) and the 14th Amendment (which was added to the Constitution to restrict the states). As Casey explained, “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.” Using the force of law to compel a person to use her body against her will to bring a pregnancy to term is a violation of her physical autonomy and decisional freedom—which the Constitution does not allow.
2. Any pre-viability ban is unconstitutional. Period.
In Casey, the Supreme Court was asked for the sixth time in a decade to overturn Roe, and the Court essentially said forget it. “We answer the question,” the authors of the controlling opinion wrote, “whether a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability could be constitutional … The answer is no.”
What part of “no” don’t conservative leaders understand? The state may not prohibit abortion before viability. A pregnancy is generally considered viable around 24 to 26 weeks. But, as the Court has recognized, this is a medical determination specific to each pregnancy—so even a 24-week ban would be unconstitutional. Though states continue to propose 20-week bans, every pre-viability ban that has been challenged in federal court has been struck down. The Supreme Court declined two recent invitations to revisit the viability line, set out in Roe and affirmed in Casey, when the Court was asked to review rulings striking down North Dakota’s six-week ban and Arkansas’ 12-week ban. Not even the late Justice Antonin Scalia or Justice Clarence Thomas (now the Court’s last remaining member who has called for overturning Roe) publicly dissented from the decision not to take the case.
It has been “black letter law”—or an established legal rule—for 40 years that abortion cannot be banned before viability with or without exceptions. The government may not condition whether a woman can have an abortion on whether she can prove she has been raped or her health is endangered because she has an absolute right to one before viability for any reason. When Democrats emphasized, for example, former Republican presidential hopefuls Texas Sen. Ted Cruz‘s or Florida Sen. Marco Rubio’s callousness toward women who want to abort a pregnancy resulting from rape, they may have legitimized the idea that a pre-viability abortion ban with the exceptions Donald Trump supports might be permissible.
Similarly, while it is important to combat the racist stereotypes that animate proposed bans for race- and sex-selective abortion—it should be repeated that requiring any inquiry into a person’s reasons for a pre-viability abortion is flagrantly unconstitutional.
Abortion opponents often try to frame 20-week bans as a moderate compromise. In fact, theyare advocating for a radical departure from Roe and Casey’s viability rule. The Court has been clear that departure will not be forthcoming. So it doesn’t matter if 20-week bans poll well—any pre-viability ban is unconstitutional.
But Democrats who are asked what’s wrong with banning abortion after 20 weeks often talk about health conditions and deference to a woman’s doctor. There is little use in explaining the reasons patients need later abortions to proponents of bans intended to vilify women who have them—that only perpetuates the idea that every possible policy is still up for debate because there are no constitutional boundaries.
And when Democrats, asked questions meant to paint them as extremists, fail to give a straight answer to whether abortion can be prohibited at any point in pregnancy, they miss the opportunity to give an apparently much-needed reminder that—say it with me—pre-viability bans are unconstitutional. In Hillary Clinton’s response to Rubio’s claim that she supports abortion being legal “on the baby’s due date,” for example, Clinton said Rubio should know Roe has guidelines. She didn’t, however, say what they are: A woman has the right to end a pregnancy before viability or if it endangers her health. States can prohibit abortions after viability, and most of them do. That is not to say they should. The idea that women wait until the third trimester to abort healthy pregnancies is a myth; women prefer to have very early abortions, and third-trimester abortions are generally unavailable because only a handful of doctors provide them.
Leading Democrats should not have trouble answering questions about abortion. Democratic National Committee Chair Debbi Wasserman Schultz, who has wrung her hands about young women not understanding the importance of Roe, would do well to make sure she can answer ridiculous questions about “abortions at eight months” with Roe basics herself. That would also be preferable to Nancy Pelosi debating what “abortion on demand” means and whether she supports it. When abortion opponents raise the specter of later abortions to shame women, Democrats should tell them states are constitutionally free to ban post-viability abortions that almost no one is having.
When we can’t explain as basic a rule as “no pre-viability bans,” we invite abortion opponents to move the goalposts.One prominent advocate for gradually re-criminalizing abortion (but who claims to be a moderate) argued in the Los Angeles Times that a law banning abortion at 20 weeks might withstand constitutional scrutiny if it also mandated paid maternity leave, because that would make the pregnancy less burdensome. That is an extremely audacious twisting of Casey, which allowed states to enact laws aimed at persuading a woman to carry to term so long as they do not impose an “undue burden” on those seeking an abortion, but was perfectly clear that she has the right to one before viability. The test is whether a restriction makes it unduly burdensome for a woman to get the abortion she is entitled to, not whether it would unduly burden her to be forced by the government to carry to term.
3. Casey‘s “undue burden” standard is a meaningful protection of abortion rights when courts apply it properly.
Casey changed the standard courts use to determine when an abortion restriction short of a ban is unconstitutional—it did not “kill”Roe. Saying so helps savvy anti-choicers portrays the doctrine protecting abortion as weaker than it isand emboldens legislators to pass blatantly unconstitutional laws.
Casey replaced Roe’s trimester framework, which set out different standards for what restrictions are permissible by trimester, with the “undue burden” standard. Under Casey, the government may try to promote potential life from the outset of pregnancy—but only by trying to influence a woman’s decision, not by trying to hinder her once she has made it. A law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion is “an undue burden” on her right and thus unconstitutional.
The provisions of the Texas abortion law challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court case to be decided any day now, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, are clearly unconstitutional; the law requires all abortions to be performed in hospital-like facilities by doctors with hospital admitting privileges. The idea that such provisions are meant to protect women rather than make getting an abortion more difficult and expensive doesn’t pass the laugh test, and the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding them is an outlier. Other courts have assessed the evidence and determined that they have no medical benefit—and, thus, the burdens they impose are “undue.”
But in the run-up to Whole Woman’s Health, too many abortion rights supporters have suggested the undue burden standard is toothless, essentially echoing anti-abortion advocates and a rogue appeals court engaged in an obvious attack on the Supreme Court’s precedent. Rather than encouraging the idea that no burden is “undue” unless it is “insurmountable,”abortion rights supporters should embrace an interpretation of the term more consistent with its meaning in the English language, as the majority of courts have. In an opinion striking down Wisconsin’s admitting privileges requirement, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained a burden is undue if it is “disproportionate or gratuitous.” Even a slight burden resulting from a medical regulation with no medical benefit is undue. Abortion rights supporters should not indulge the idea that shutting down 75 percent of the clinics in Texas might not be.
This matters because public understanding of the law puts pressure on courts and legislators to uphold it. We have to know our rights if we want them to be protected.